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Abstract
In many communication channels, secrecy constraints usually incur a penalty in capacity, as well as generalized
degrees-of-freedom (GDoF). In this work we show an interesting observation that, adding a helper can totally remove
the penalty in sum GDoF, for a two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel. For the interference channel
where each transmitter sends a message to an intended receiver without secrecy constraints, the sum GDoF is
a well-known “W” curve, characterized by Etkin-Tse-Wang in 2008. If the secrecy constraints are imposed on
this interference channel, where the message of each transmitter must be secure from the unintended receiver
(eavesdropper), then a GDoF penalty is incurred and the secure sum GDoF is reduced to a modified “W” curve,
derived by Chen recently. In this work we show that, by adding a helper into this interference channel with secrecy
constraints, the secure sum GDoF turns out to be a “W” curve, which is the same as the sum GDoF of the setting
without secrecy constraints. The proposed scheme is based on the cooperative jamming and a careful signal design
such that the jamming signal of the helper is aligned at a specific direction and power level with the information
signals of the transmitters, which allows to totally remove the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints.
Furthermore, the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation due to the rational independence
are used in the secure rate analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Shannon’s seminal work in 1949 [1], information-theoretic secrecy has been studied for many
years in many communication channels, such as wiretap channels [2]–[4], broadcast channels [5]–[8],
multiple access channels and interference channels [5], [9]–[31]. In the pioneer work by Wyner in 1975
[2], the notion of secure capacity was introduced via a wiretap channel with secrecy constraint. For this
wiretap channel, Wyner showed that there is a penalty in capacity due to the secrecy constraint. Later on,
it has been shown that this insight also holds true for the other channels (see, e.g., [5], [14], [15], [19],
[21], [24]–[26], [30]).
This work focuses on the secure sum generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF, a capacity approximation)
of a two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel, and shows an interesting observation that the
penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints can be totally removed by adding a helper. For the
symmetric Gaussian interference channel without secrecy constraints, the sum GDoF is characterized as
a well-known “W” curve (cf. [32]). If the secrecy constraints are imposed on this interference channel,
where the message of each transmitter must be secure from the unintended receiver (eavesdropper), the
work in [31] showed that the secure sum GDoF is then reduced to a modified “W” curve (see Fig. 1). It
reveals that there is a penalty in GDoF in a large regime due to the secrecy constraints. Interestingly, this
work shows that adding a helper can totally remove the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints
(see Fig. 1). In other words, by adding a helper, the secure sum GDoF of the interference channel derived
in this work is exactly the same as the sum GDoF of the interference channel without secrecy constraints.
The proposed scheme is based on cooperative jamming and signal alignment. Specifically, the helper
sends a cooperative jamming signal at a specific direction and power level to confuse the eavesdroppers,
while keeping legitimate receivers’ abilities to decode their desired messages. The role of helper(s) in
secure communications has been studied extensively in the literature (see [5], [9], [21], [24], [33] and
references therein). The helper can be the node transmitting its own confidential message (cf. [5], [9],
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Fig. 1. Secure sum GDoF vs. α for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with a helper, where α corresponds to the
interference-to-signal ratio (all link strengths in decibel scale). Note that the secure sum GDoF of the interference channel with a helper,
derived in this work (cf. Theorem 1), is the same as the sum GDoF of the interference channel without secrecy constraints (cf. [32]). Without
any helper, there is a penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints (cf. [31]).
[21], [24]), as well as the node without transmitting any message (cf. [21], [33]). The helper considered in
our setting refers to the latter case, which is able to totally remove the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy
constraints. For the proposed scheme, the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation
due to rational independence (cf. [34]) are used in the secure rate analysis.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model. Section III
presents the main result of this work. Section IV describes the proposed scheme via an example. The
achievability proof is given in Sections V-VIII and the appendices, while the converse proof is given in
Section IX. Section X concludes this work. Throughout this work, I(•), H(•) and h(•) denote the mutual
information, entropy and differential entropy, respectively. Z , Z+ and R denote the sets of integers,
positive integers and real numbers, respectively. o(•) comes from the standard Landau notation, where
f(x) = o(g(x)) implies that limx→∞ f(x)/g(x) = 0. Logarithms are in base 2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this setting, we consider a two-user Gaussian interference channel with a helper and confidential
messages (see Fig. 2). The output of the channel at receiver k at time t is
yk(t) =
3∑
`=1
2mk`hk`x`(t) + zk(t), k = 1, 2 (1)
t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where x`(t) is the normalized channel input at transmitter ` under the power constraint
E|x`(t)|2 ≤ 1; zk(t) ∼ N (0, 1) is the additive white Gaussian noise at receiver k; mk` is a nonnegative
integer; and hk` ∈ (1, 2] is a normalized channel coefficient, for k = 1, 2 and ` = 1, 2, 3. In our setting,
transmitter 3 is the helper. By following the convention in [31], we let P ,maxk{22mkk}, and define
αk`,
log 2mk`
1
2
logP
k = 1, 2, ` = 1, 2, 3. (2)
Then, we can rewrite the channel model in (1) as
yk(t) =
3∑
`=1
√
Pαk`hk`x`(t) + zk(t), k = 1, 2 (3)
where αk` ≥ 0 denotes the channel strength of the link between transmitter ` and receiver k. In the rest
of this work, we will consider the channel model in (3). It is assumed that all the channel parameters
{αk`, hk`}k,` are available at each node. For the symmetric case, it is assumed that
α11 = α22 = 1, α21 = α12 = α13 = α23 = α, α ≥ 0.
3Rx1
Rx2
Tx1
Helper
w1
Tx2
w2
wˆ1
wˆ2 w1
w2
Fig. 2. Two-user interference channel with a helper and confidential messages.
In this interference channel, a confidential message wk is sent from transmitter k to receiver k, where
wk is uniformly chosen from a set Wk,{1, 2, · · · , 2nRk}, for k = 1, 2. At transmitter k, a stochastic
function
fk :Wk ×W ′k → Rn, k = 1, 2
is used to map the message wk ∈ Wk to a transmitted codeword xnk = fk(wk, w′k) ∈ Rn, where w′k ∈ W ′k
denotes the randomness in this mapping, and w′k is available at transmitter k only. At transmitter 3 (the
helper), the following function
f3 :W ′3 → Rn
is used to generate xn3 = f3(w
′
k), where the random variable w
′
3 ∈ W ′3 is available at transmitter 3 only.
We assume that the random variables {w1, w′1, w2, w′2, w′3} are mutually independent. A secure rate pair
(R1, R2) is said to be achievable if for any  > 0 there exists a sequence of n-length codes such that each
receiver can decode its own message reliably and the messages are kept secret such that
I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n, I(w2; yn1 ) ≤ n. (4)
The secure capacity region, denoted by C, is the closure of the set of all achievable (R1, R2) secure rate
pairs. We define the secure sum capacity as:
Csum, sup
{
R1 +R2| (R1, R2) ∈ C
}
. (5)
We also define the secure sum GDoF as
dsum, lim
P→∞
Csum
1
2
logP
. (6)
Note that the GDoF is a form of capacity approximation. It is more general than degrees-of-freedom
(DoF), as the latter considers only a specific case with αk` = 1,∀k, `.
III. MAIN RESULT
This section provides the main result of this work, for the secure communication over a two-user
symmetric Gaussian interference channel with a helper.
Theorem 1. Considering the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with a helper defined
in Section II, for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3, the optimal secure sum GDoF is
characterized as
dsum =

2(1− α) for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
(7a)
2α for 1
2
≤ α ≤ 2
3
(7b)
2(1− α/2) for 2
3
≤ α ≤ 1 (7c)
α for 1 ≤ α ≤ 2 (7d)
2 for α ≥ 2 . (7e)
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Fig. 3. Rate (GDoF) and power description at receivers 1 and 2 when α = 3/4.
In this setting defined in Section II, Theorem 1 reveals that adding a helper can totally remove the
secrecy constraints, in the sense that the secure sum GDoF of the interference channel with a helper and
with secrecy constraints is the same as the sum GDoF of the interference channel without any helper
and without secrecy constraints (a “W” curve, see [32] and Fig. 1). The optimal secure sum GDoF is
achieved by a cooperative jamming scheme. The achievability is described in Section V. The converse
proof is provided in Section IX. Before providing the achievability, we describe the proposed scheme via
an example in the following section.
IV. SCHEME EXAMPLE
In this section, we will describe the outline of the proposed scheme via an example. We will focus on
the specific case with α = 3/4, for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with secrecy
constraints and with a helper defined in Section II. Note that, for the two-user symmetric Gaussian
interference channel without any secrecy constraints, the sum GDoF is 5/4 when α = 3/4 (cf. [32]).
If the secrecy constraints are imposed on this interference channel, where the message of each transmitter
must be secure from the unintended receiver, the secure sum GDoF is reduced to 1 when α = 3/4
(cf. [31]). Therefore, there is a penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints. Interestingly, we will
shows that adding a helper can totally remove the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints, that
is, by adding a helper the secure sum GDoF is increased to 5/4, which is exactly the same as the sum
GDoF of the interference channel without secrecy constraints. For the proposed scheme, pulse amplitude
modulation (PAM) and signal alignment will be used in the signal design, and the estimation approaches
of noise removal and signal separation will be used in the rate analysis. The scheme is motivated by the
cooperative jamming scheme proposed in [31] for a different setting, i.e., a two-user interference channel
with confidential messages but without any helper.
For this case with α = 3/4, the transmitted signals are designed as (removing the time index):
x1 =h23h12v1,c +
√
P−3/4 · h23h12v1,p (8)
x2 =h13h21v2,c +
√
P−3/4 · h13h21v2,p (9)
x3 =h12h21u3, (10)
where vk,c and vk,p are two signals that carry the message of transmitter k, for k = 1, 2, and u3 is the
jamming signal from transmitter 3. The random variables {v1,c, v1,p, v2,c, v2,p, u3} are mutually independent.
Specifically, for Ω(ξ,Q),{ξ ·a : a ∈ Z∩[−Q,Q]} denoting the PAM constellation set, the above random
variables are independently and uniformly drawn from their PAM constellation sets, given as
vk,c ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γ · 1
Q
, Q = P
3/8−
2 ) (11)
vk,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γ · 1
Q
, Q = P
1/4−
2 ) (12)
u3 ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γ · 1
Q
, Q = P
3/8−
2 ) (13)
5respectively, for k = 1, 2, where  > 0 can be made arbitrarily small, and γ is a finite constant such
that γ ∈ (0, 1
8
√
2
]
. Based on our signal design, vk,c carries 3/8 GDoF and vk,p carries 1/4 GDoF, that is,
H(vk,c) = 3/82 logP + o(logP ) and H(vk,p) =
1/4
2
logP + o(logP ), when → 0, for k = 1, 2. The above
signal design satisfies the average power constraints, E|x1|2 ≤ 1, E|x2|2 ≤ 1 and E|x3|2 ≤ 1, which will
be proved in the next section in detail. Then, the received signals at the receivers 1 and 2 are given as
(without time index)
y1 =
√
Ph11h23h12v1,c +
√
P 1/4h11h23h12v1,p
+
√
P 3/4h12h21h13(v2,c + u3) + h12h21h13v2,p + z1 (14)
y2 =
√
Ph22h13h21v2,c +
√
P 1/4h22h13h21v2,p
+
√
P 3/4h21h12h23(v1,c + u3) + h21h12h23v1,p + z2. (15)
At receiver 1, the information signal v2,c of transmitter 2 is aligned with the jamming signal u3 of the
helper. At receiver 2, the information signal v1,c of transmitter 1 is aligned with the jamming signal
u3 of the helper. As we will see later on, the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraint will be
minimized with this signal alignment design. Fig. 3 describes the rate (GDoF) and power of some signals
at receivers 1 and 2 when α = 3/4.
As we will discuss in detail in the next section, the secure rate pair
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) (16)
R2 = I(v2; y2)− I(v2; y1|v1) (17)
is achievable by the proposed scheme with a careful codebook design and message mapping. Let us begin
with the secure rate R1 expressed in (16). On one hand, we expect the term I(v1; y1) to be sufficiently
large; on the other hand, we expect the term I(v1; y2|v2) to be sufficiently small. Let vˆ1,c and vˆ1,p be
the estimates for v1,c and v1,p respectively from y1, and let Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}] denote the
corresponding estimation error probability. Then the term I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1)
≥I(v1; vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p) (18)
=H(v1)−H(v1|vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p)
≥H(v1)−
(
1 + Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}] ·H(v1)
)
(19)
=
(
1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]
) ·H(v1)− 1 (20)
where (18) results from the Markov chain v1 → y1 → {vˆ1,c, vˆ1,p}; (19) results from Fano’s inequality.
Note that, based on our signal design, {v1,p, v1,c} can be reconstructed from v1, and vice versa, because
v1 takes the form of v1 = v1,c +
√
P−3/4 · v1,p and the minimum of v1,c/2 is bigger than the maximum of√
P−3/4 · v1,p. In this case v1,c carries 3/8 GDoF and v1,p carries 1/4 GDoF, which implies that v1 carries
5/8 GDoF. The term H(v1) in (20) then becomes
H(v1) =
5/8
2
logP + o(logP ). (21)
In Sections V and VIII we will prove that v1,c and v1,p designed in (11)-(13) can be estimated from y1 by
using the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation, and the corresponding estimation
error probability is
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]→ 0 as P →∞ (22)
for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3. The proof outline of (22) will be provided later
on in this section. By incorporating (21) and (22) into (20), it gives
I(v1; y1) ≥ 5/8
2
logP + o(logP ) (23)
6for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3.
On the other hand, I(v1; y2|v2) can be bounded as
I(v1; y2|v2) ≤ log(2
√
65). (24)
The detailed proof is provided in the next section. This term I(v1; y2|v2) can be considered as a penalty
term in the secure rate R1. The result in (24) reveals that this penalty is sufficiently small, based on our
careful signal design. In the proposed scheme, the jamming signal of the helper is aligned at a specific
direction and power level with the information signals of the transmitters, which minimizes the rate
penalty due to the secrecy constraints. Finally, with the results in (23) and (24), the secure rate R1 is
lower bounded by
R1 = I(v1; y1)−I(v1; y2|v2)≥ 5/8
2
logP+o(logP )
and similarly, the secure rate R2 is lower bounded by R2 ≥ 5/82 logP+o(logP ), for almost all the channel
coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3. Then the secure GDoF pair (d1 = 5/8, d2 = 5/8) can be achieved by the
proposed cooperative jamming scheme for almost all the channel coefficients in this case with α = 3/4.
In the following we provide the proof outline of (22). After some manipulations, y1 in (14) can be
rewritten as
y1 = P
3/8+
2 · 2γ · (
√
P 1/4g0q0 + g1q1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,xs
+z˜1
where xs,
√
P 1/4g0q0+g1q1, z˜1,
√
P 1/4h11h23h12v1,p+h12h21h13v2,p+z1, g0,h11h23h12, g1,h12h21h13
q0, Qmax2γ · v1,c, q1, Qmax2γ · (v2,c + u3), and Qmax,P
3/8−
2 . One important step is to estimate xs from y1
by treating other signals as noise. This step is called as noise removal. After correctly decoding xs, we
can recover q0 and q1 from xs because g0 and g1 are rationally independent. This step is called as signal
separation (cf. [34]). As we will show in Section VIII, the average power of the virtual noise z˜1 is bounded
by
E|z˜1|2 ≤ κP 1/4
for a finite constant κ. To estimate xs from y1, we show in Section VIII that the minimum distance of
xs, denoted by dmin, is bounded by
dmin ≥ δP−1/16 (25)
for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3 \ Hout, where Hout ⊆ (1, 2]2×3 is an outage set and the
Lebesgue measure of this outage set, denoted by L(Hout), satisfies
L(Hout) ≤ 1792δ · P− 2 (26)
for some constants δ ∈ (0, 1] and  > 0. The proofs of (25) and (26) build on the conclusion of Lemma 1
(see below). The results of (25) and (26) reveal that, the minimum distance of xs is sufficiently large for
almost all the channel coefficients in the regime of large P , that is L(Hout) → 0 as P → ∞. At this
point we can decode the sum xs =
√
P 1/4g0q0 + g1q1 from y1 by treating other signals as noise (noise
removal), with vanishing error probability. After that we can recover q0 = Qmax2γ · v1,c, as well as v1,c, from
xs because g0 and g1 are rationally independent (rational independence). By removing the decoded xs
from y1, v1,p can be estimated with vanishing error probability, resulting in
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]→ 0 as P →∞
for almost all the channel coefficients in the regime of large P . The lemma used in the proofs of (25)
and (26) is given as follows.
7Lemma 1. Let β ∈ (0, 1], τ ∈ Z+ and τ > 1, and A0, A1, Q0, Q1 ∈ Z+. Define the event
B(q0, q1),{(g0, g1) ∈ (1, τ ]2 : |A0g0q0 + A1g1q1| < β} (27)
and set
B,
⋃
q0,q1∈Z:
(q0,q1)6=0,
|qk|≤Qk ∀k
B(q0, q1). (28)
Then the Lebesgue measure of B, denoted by L(B), is bounded by
L(B) ≤ 8(τ − 1)βmin{Q1Q0
A1
,
Q0Q1
A0
,
Q0τ
A1
,
Q1τ
A0
}.
Proof. See Section VI.
V. ACHIEVABILITY
In this section, for the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II, we
provide a cooperative jamming scheme, focusing on the regime of α > 1/2. Note that when 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2,
the optimal secure sum GDoF dsum = 2(1−α) is achievable by a scheme without any helper and without
cooperative jamming (cf. [31]). In the proposed scheme, pulse amplitude modulation and signal alignment
will be used. In what follows, we describe the details of codebook generation and signal mapping, PAM
constellation and signal alignment, and secure rate analysis.
1) Codebook generation and signal mapping: At transmitter k, k = 1, 2, it generates a codebook given
as
Bk,
{
vnk (wk, w
′
k) : wk ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nRk}, w′k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
k}
}
(29)
where vnk are the codewords. All the elements of the codewords are independent and identically generated
according to a distribution that will be defined later on. In (29), w′k is the confusion message that is
used to guarantee the security of the confidential message wk. Rk and R′k are the rates of wk and w
′
k,
respectively, which will be defined later on (see (40) and (41)). To transmit the message wk, transmitter k
selects a sub-codebook Bk(wk) that is defined as
Bk(wk),
{
vnk (wk, w
′
k) : w
′
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2nR
′
k}}, k = 1, 2
and then randomly selects a codeword vnk from Bk(wk) according to a uniform distribution. In this scheme,
the chosen codeword vnk will be mapped to the channel input such that
xk(t) = h`3hk`vk(t) (30)
for `, k = 1, 2, ` 6= k, and t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where vk(t) is the tth element of the codeword vnk .
2) PAM constellation and signal alignment: Specifically, each element of the codeword at transmitter
k, k = 1, 2, is designed to take the following form
vk =
√
P−βvk,c · vk,c +
√
P−βvk,p · vk,p (31)
which implies that the channel input in (30) can be rewritten as
xk =
√
P−βvk,c · h`3hk`vk,c +
√
P−βvk,p · h`3hk`vk,p (32)
(removing the time index for simplicity) for `, k = 1, 2, ` 6= k. At the helper (transmitter 3), it sends a
cooperative jamming signal designed as
x3 =
√
P−βu3 · h12h21u3. (33)
8In (32) and (33), vk,c, vk,p and u3 are independent random variables which are uniformly drawn from their
PAM constellation sets
vk,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γvk,c ·
1
Q
, Q = P
λvk,c
2 ) (34)
vk,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γvk,p ·
1
Q
, Q = P
λvk,p
2 ) (35)
u3 ∈ Ω(ξ = γu3 ·
1
Q
, Q = P
λu3
2 ) (36)
respectively, for k = 1, 2, and γvk,c , γvk,p and γu3 are some finite constants designed as
γv1,c = γv2,c = γu3 = 2γv1,p = 2γv2,p = 2γ ∈
(
0,
1
4
√
2
]
. (37)
Table I provides the designed parameters {βvk,c , βvk,p , βu3 , λvk,c , λvk,p , λu3}k=1,2 for different cases of α
in the proposed scheme. Based on our signal design (see (32)-(37)), it can be checked that the power
constraint E|xk|2 ≤ 1 is satisfied for k = 1, 2, 3. For example, since v1,c and v1,p are uniformly drawn
from Ω(ξ = 2γ · 1
Q
, Q = P
λv1,c
2 ) and Ω(ξ = γ · 1
Q
, Q = P
λv1,p
2 ) respectively, we have
E|v1,c|2 =
8γ2 · 1
Q2
2Q+ 1
Q∑
i=1
i2 ≤ 8γ
2
3
for Q = P
λv1,c
2
E|v1,p|2 =
2γ2 · 1
Q2
2Q+ 1
Q∑
i=1
i2 ≤ 2γ
2
3
for Q = P
λv1,p
2
which implies that
E|x1|2
=P−βv1,c |h23|2|h12|2E|v1,c|2 + P−βv1,p |h23|2|h12|2E|v1,p|2
≤16× 8γ
2
3
+ 16× 2γ
2
3
=
160γ2
3
≤1
where h`k ∈ (1, 2],∀`, k and γ ∈
(
0, 1
8
√
2
]
. Similarly, one can check that E|x2|2 ≤ 1 and E|x3|2 ≤ 1.
Based on the above signal design, the received signals at the receivers 1 and 2 take the following forms
(without the time index)
y1 =
√
P 1−βv1,ch11h23h12v1,c +
√
P 1−βv1,ph11h23h12v1,p
+ h12h21h13(
√
Pα−βv2,cv2,c +
√
Pα−βu3u3)
+
√
Pα−βv2,ph12h21h13v2,p + z1 (38)
y2 =
√
P 1−βv2,ch22h13h21v2,c +
√
P 1−βv2,ph22h13h21v2,p
+ h21h12h23(
√
Pα−βv1,cv1,c +
√
Pα−βu3u3)
+
√
Pα−βv1,ph21h12h23v1,p + z2. (39)
Based on our signal design, at receiver 1 the signal v2,c is aligned with the jamming signal u3, while at
receiver 2 the signal v1,c is aligned with the jamming signal u3.
9TABLE I
PARAMETER DESIGN FOR THE SYMMETRIC CHANNEL, FOR SOME  > 0.
1
2
< α ≤ 2
3
2
3
≤ α ≤ 1 1 ≤ α ≤ 2 2 ≤ α
βv1,c , βv2,c 0 0 0 0
βu3 0 0 0 0
βv1,p , βv2,p α α ∞ ∞
λv1,c , λv2,c 2α− 1−  α/2−  α/2−  1− 
λu3 2α− 1−  α/2−  α/2−  1− 
λv1,p , λv2,p 1− α−  1− α−  0 0
3) Secure rate analysis: We define the rates Rk and R′k as
Rk, I(vk; yk)− I(vk; y`|v`)−  (40)
R′k, I(vk; y`|v`)−  (41)
for some  > 0, `, k = 1, 2, ` 6= k. Given the above codebook design and signal mapping, the result of [24,
Theorem 2] (or [5, Theorem 2]) implies that the rate pair (R1, R2) defined in (40) and (41) is achievable
and messages w1 and w2 are secure, i.e., I(w1; yn2 ) ≤ n and I(w2; yn1 ) ≤ n.
In what follows we will focus on the regime of α > 1/2 and analyze the secure rate performance of
the cooperative jamming scheme. We will consider four cases: 1
2
< α ≤ 2
3
, 2
3
≤ α ≤ 1, 1 ≤ α ≤ 2 and
2 ≤ α. We will first consider the cases of 1
2
< α ≤ 2
3
and 2 ≤ α, in which a successive decoding method
will be used in the rate analysis. Later on we will consider the rest two cases, in which the estimation
approaches of noise removal and signal separation due to rational independence will be used in the rate
analysis.
A. Rate analysis when 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3
For the case with 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3, the parameters are designed as
βv1,c = βv2,c = 0, λv1,c = λv2,c = 2α− 1−  (42)
βv1,p = βv2,p = α, λv1,p = λv2,p = 1− α−  (43)
βu3 = 0, λu3 = 2α− 1− , (44)
where  > 0 can be set arbitrarily small. In this case, the transmitted signal at transmitter k, k = 1, 2, 3,
is
x1 =h23h12v1,c +
√
P−α · h23h12v1,p (45)
x2 =h13h21v2,c +
√
P−α · h13h21v2,p (46)
x3 =h12h21u3. (47)
Then the received signals at the receivers 1 and 2 are given by
y1 =
√
Ph11h23h12v1,c +
√
P 1−αh11h23h12v1,p
+
√
Pαh12h21h13(v2,c + u3) + h12h21h13v2,p + z1 (48)
y2 =
√
Ph22h13h21v2,c +
√
P 1−αh22h13h21v2,p
+
√
Pαh21h12h23(v1,c + u3) + h21h12h23v1,p + z2. (49)
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Fig. 4. Rate (GDoF) and power description at receiver 1 when α = 2/3.
Fig. 4 depicts the rate (GDoF) and power of some signals at receiver 1 when α = 2/3.
For the proposed cooperative jamming scheme, the secure rate pair (R1, R2) defined in (40) and (41)
can be achieved. For → 0, this secure rate pair can be written as
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) (50)
R2 = I(v2; y2)− I(v2; y1|v1). (51)
First, we focus on the lower bound of R1 expressed in (50) and seek to get a tight lower bound on
I(v1; y1). For this case, v1 is designed as
v1 = v1,c +
√
P−α · v1,p
(see (31), (42) and (43)). From y1 expressed in (48), we can estimate {v1,c, v1,p} by using a successive
decoding method, given the design in (34)-(36) and (42)-(47). From the steps in (18)-(20), I(v1; y1) can
be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]
) ·H(v1)− 1. (52)
Given that v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,c · 1Q , Q = P
2α−1−
2 ) and v1,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,p · 1Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ), the rates of
v1,c and v1,p are computed as follows:
H(v1,c) = log(2 · P 2α−1−2 + 1) (53)
H(v1,p) = log(2 · P 1−α−2 + 1) (54)
In this case, {v1,p, v1,c} can be reconstructed from v1, and vice versa. This fact, together with (53) and
(54), gives
H(v1) = H(v1,c) +H(v1,p)
=
α− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (55)
To further derive the lower bound on I(v1; y1) from (52), we provide an upper bound on the error probability
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}], described in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. When 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3, given the signal design in (34)-(36) and (42)-(47), the error probability
of estimating {vk,c, vk,p} from yk, k = 1, 2, is
Pr[{vk,c 6= vˆk,c} ∪ {vk,p 6= vˆk,p}]→ 0 as P →∞. (56)
Proof. See Section VII.
By combining (52), (55) and Lemma 2, I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded as
I(v1; y1) ≥ α− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (57)
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Fig. 5. Rate (GDoF) and power description at receiver 1 when α = 2.
Let us now focus on the term I(v1; y2|v2) in (50), which can be upper bounded by
I(v1; y2|v2)
≤I(v1; y2, v1,c + u3|v2) (58)
=I(v1; v1,c + u3) + I(v1;h21h12h23v1,p + z2|v2, v1,c + u3) (59)
=H(v1,c + u3)−H(u3)
+ h(h21h12h23v1,p + z2|v2, v1,c + u3)− h(z2) (60)
≤ log(4 · P 2α−1−2 + 1)− log(2 · P 2α−1−2 + 1)
+ h(h21h12h23v1,p + z2)− 1
2
log(2pie) (61)
≤1 + 1
2
log(2pie× 65)− 1
2
log(2pie) (62)
= log(2
√
65) (63)
where (59) follows from the fact that v1, v2, u3 are mutually independent; (60) stems from that {vk,p, vk,c}
can be reconstructed from vk for k = 1, 2; (61) holds true because H(u3) = log(2 · P 2α−1−2 + 1) and
H(v1,c + u3) ≤ log(4 · P 2α−1−2 + 1); (62) follows from the derivation that h(h21h12h23v1,p + z2) ≤
1
2
log(2pie(|h21|2 · |h12|2 · |h23|2 · E|v1,p|2 + E|z2|2)) ≤ 12 log(2pie× 65).
Finally, by incorporating (57) and (63) into (50), we can bound the secure rate R1 as
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) ≥ α− 2
2
logP + o(logP ).
Let → 0, then the secure GDoF d1 = α is achievable. Due to the symmetry, d2 = α is also achievable
by the proposed cooperative jamming scheme when 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3.
B. Rate analysis when α ≥ 2
For the case with α ≥ 2, the parameters are designed as
βv1,c = βv2,c = 0, λv1,c = λv2,c = 1−  (64)
βv1,p = βv2,p =∞, λv1,p = λv2,p = 0 (65)
βu3 = 0, λu3 = 1− . (66)
In this case, the transmitted signals are designed as
x1 =h23h12v1,c, x2 =h13h21v2,c, x3 =h12h21u3. (67)
Then the received signals at the receivers 1 and 2 become
y1 =
√
Ph11h23h12v1,c +
√
Pαh12h21h13(v2,c + u3) + z1 (68)
y2 =
√
Ph22h13h21v2,c +
√
Pαh21h12h23(v1,c + u3) + z2. (69)
Figure 5 depicts the rate and power of some signals at receiver 1 when α = 2.
12
From (40) and (41), the secure rates R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) and R2 = I(v2; y2)− I(v2; y1|v1) can
be achieved by the proposed scheme. For this case, vk is designed as
vk = vk,c, k = 1, 2.
From yk expressed in (68) and (69), we can estimate vk,c by using a successive decoding method, for
k = 1, 2. Lemma 3 provides a result on the error probability for this estimation.
Lemma 3. When α ≥ 2, given the signal design in (34)-(36) and (64)-(67), the error probability of
estimating vk,c from yk, k = 1, 2, is
Pr[vk,c 6= vˆk,c]→ 0 as P →∞. (70)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Considering the lower bound on the secure rate R1, I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]
) ·H(v1)− 1 (71)
by following the steps in (18)-(20). In this case with v1 = v1,c and v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,c · 1Q , Q = P
1−
2 ),
the rate of v1 is given by
H(v1) = H(v1,c) = log(2 · P 1−2 + 1). (72)
By combining (72) and Lemma 3, the lower bound of I(v1; y1) is given as
I(v1; y1) ≥ 1− 
2
logP + o(logP ). (73)
By following the steps (58)-(63), I(v1; y2|v2) can be bounded by
I(v1; y2|v2)
≤I(v1; y2, v1,c + u3|v2)
=I(v1; v1,c + u3|v2) + I(v1; y2|v2, v1,c + u3)
=I(v1; v1,c + u3) + I(v1; z2|v2, v1,c + u3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=H(v1,c + u3)−H(u3)
≤ log(4 · P 1−2 + 1)− log(2 · P 1−2 + 1)
≤1. (74)
Finally, with the results in (73) and (74), we can bound the secure rate R1 as
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) ≥ 1− 
2
logP + o(logP ).
Let  → 0, then the secure GDoF d1 = 1 is achievable. Due to the symmetry, d2 = 1 is also achievable
by the proposed cooperative jamming scheme when α ≥ 2.
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C. Rate analysis when 2/3 ≤ α ≤ 1
The rate analysis for this case is different from that for the previous two cases. In the previous two
cases, a successive decoding method is used in the rate analysis. In this case, we will use the estimation
approaches of noise removal and signal separation due to rational independence that will be discussed
later on.
For this case with 2/3 ≤ α ≤ 1, the parameters are designed as
βv1,c = βv2,c = 0, λv1,c = λv2,c = α/2−  (75)
βv1,p = βv2,p = α, λv1,p = λv2,p = 1− α−  (76)
βu3 = 0, λu3 = α/2− , (77)
where  > 0 can be set arbitrarily small. In this case, the transmitted signals are designed as
x1 =h23h12v1,c +
√
P−α · h23h12v1,p (78)
x2 =h13h21v2,c +
√
P−α · h13h21v2,p (79)
x3 =h12h21u3. (80)
Then the received signals at the receivers 1 and 2 take the same forms as in (48) and (49). Fig. 3 describes
the rate and power of some signals at receivers 1 and 2 when α = 3/4.
In this proposed scheme, the secure rates R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2) and R2 = I(v2; y2)− I(v2; y1|v1)
are achievable (see (40) and (41)). Let us bound the secure rate R1 first. By following the steps in (18)-(20),
I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]
) ·H(v1)− 1. (81)
For this case, the rates of v1,c, v1,p and v1 = v1,c +
√
P−α · v1,p are computed as
H(v1,c) = log(2 · P
α/2−
2 + 1) (82)
H(v1,p) = log(2 · P 1−α−2 + 1) (83)
H(v1) =
1− α/2− 2
2
logP + o(logP ). (84)
To further derive the lower bound on I(v1; y1) from (81), we provide an upper bound on the error probability
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}], described in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. When 2/3 ≤ α ≤ 1, given the signal design in (34)-(36) and (75)-(80), then for almost all the
channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3, the error probability of estimating {vk,c, vk,p} from yk, k = 1, 2, is
Pr[{vk,c 6= vˆk,c} ∪ {vk,p 6= vˆk,p}]→ 0 as P →∞. (85)
Proof. In this proof we use the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. The full details are
described in Section VIII.
By combining (81), (84) and Lemma 4, I(v1; y1) can be lower bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥ 1− α/2− 2
2
logP + o(logP ) (86)
for almost all channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3. By following the steps in (58)-(60), I(v1; y2|v2) can
be bounded as
I(v1; y2|v2) ≤ log(2
√
65). (87)
Finally, with the results in (86) and (87), the secure rate R1 is lower bounded by
R1 = I(v1; y1)−I(v1; y2|v2)≥ 1− α/2− 2
2
logP+o(logP )
which implies the following secure GDoF d1 = 1− α/2, as well as d2 = 1− α/2 due to the symmetry,
for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3, in this case with 2/3 ≤ α ≤ 1.
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D. Rate analysis when 1 ≤ α ≤ 2
The rate analysis for this case also uses the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. For this
case, the parameters are designed as
βv1,c = βv2,c = 0, λv1,c = λv2,c = α/2−  (88)
βv1,p = βv2,p =∞, λv1,p = λv2,p = 0 (89)
βu3 = 0, λu3 = α/2− . (90)
In this case, the transmitted signals are designed as
x1 =h23h12v1,c, x2 =h13h21v2,c, x3 =h12h21u3. (91)
Then the received signals at the receivers take the forms as in (68) and (69).
In the following we will bound the secure rates expressed in (40) and (41). For this case, vk is designed
as vk = vk,c, k = 1, 2. We can estimate vk,c from yk by using the approaches of noise removal and signal
separation, k = 1, 2. Lemma 5 presents a result on the error probability for this estimation.
Lemma 5. When 1 ≤ α ≤ 2, given the signal design in (34)-(36) and (88)-(91), then for almost all
channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3, the error probability of estimating vk,c from yk, k = 1, 2, is
Pr[vk,c 6= vˆk,c]→ 0 as P →∞. (92)
Proof. In this proof we use the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. The full details are
described in Appendix B.
In the following we will show that by using Lemma 5, the secure GDoF pair (d1 = α/2, d2 = α/2) can
be achieved for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3 by the proposed cooperative jamming
scheme. In this case with v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γ · 1Q , Q = P
α/2−
2 ) and v1 = v1,c, the rate of v1 is computed as
H(v1) = H(v1,c) = log(2 · P
α/2−
2 + 1). (93)
and then, I(v1; y1) can be bounded by
I(v1; y1) ≥
(
1− Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]
) ·H(v1)− 1 (94)
=
α/2− 
2
logP + o(logP ) (95)
for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3, where (94) follows from the steps in (18)-(20);
and (95) results from (93) and Lemma 5. By following the steps related to (74), I(v1; y2|v2) can be
bounded as
I(v1; y2|v2) ≤ 1. (96)
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Fig. 7. The illustration of the set B(q0, q1) ∈ (1, τ ]2 for the case of (q0 6= 0, q1 6= 0). In this case, there is one strip with slope
−A0q0/(A1q1) and width 2β/(A1|q1|).
The final step is to incorporate (95) and (96) into (40). It then gives the lower bound on R1
R1 = I(v1; y1)− I(v1; y2|v2)
≥ α/2− 
2
logP + o(logP ) (97)
which implies the following secure GDoF d1 = α/2, as well as d2 = α/2 due to the symmetry, for almost
all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3, in this case with 1 ≤ α ≤ 2.
VI. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In this section, we will prove Lemma 1. Let β ∈ (0, 1], τ ∈ Z+ and τ > 1, A0, A1, Q0 and Q1 ∈ Z+.
Define the event
B(q0, q1),{(g0, g1) ∈ (1, τ ]2 : |A0g0q0 + A1g1q1| < β}
and set
B,
⋃
q0,q1∈Z:
(q0,q1)6=0,
|qk|≤Qk ∀k
B(q0, q1).
For (q0, q1) ∈ {(q′0, q′1) : (q′0, q′1) 6= 0, q′0, q′1 ∈ Z, |q′0| ≤ Q0, |q′1| ≤ Q1}, we will consider the following
three cases: (q0 6= 0, q1 6= 0), (q0 6= 0, q1 = 0), and (q0 = 0, q1 6= 0).
Let us consider the case with (q0 6= 0, q1 6= 0) first. In this case, assuming that A0|q0| ≥ τA1|q1| + 1,
then it gives
|A0g0q0 + A1g1q1| ≥ A0g0|q0| − A1g1|q1|
≥ A0|q0| − τA1|q1|
≥ 1
≥ β (98)
which contradicts the event |A0g0q0 + A1g1q1| < β defined in B(q0, q1). Therefore, without loss of
generality we will consider
A0|q0| ≤ τA1|q1| (99)
for the case with (q0 6= 0, q1 6= 0).
For the first case with (q0 6= 0, q1 6= 0) , as shown in Fig. 7, the set B(q0, q1) has one strip with slope
−A0q0/(A1q1) and width 2β/(A1|q1|). The area of this set is upper bounded by
L(B(q0, q1)) ≤ (τ − 1) · 2β
A1|q1| =
2(τ − 1)β
A1|q1| . (100)
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For the second case with (q0 6= 0, q1 = 0), it holds true that |A0g0q0 +A1g1q1| = |A0g0q0| ≥ 1 ≥ β for
any (g0, g1) ∈ (1, τ ]2, which implies that
L(B(q0, 0)) = 0 (101)
based on the definition of B(q0, q1). Similarly, for the last case with (q0 = 0, q1 6= 0), it holds true that
L(B(0, q1)) = 0. (102)
By combining (99)-(102), L(B) can be upper bounded by
L(B) = L( ⋃
q0,q1∈Z:
(q0,q1)6=0,
|qk|≤Qk ∀k
B(q0, q1)
)
≤
∑
q0,q1∈Z:
(q0,q1)6=0,
|qk|≤Qk ∀k
L(B(q0, q1))
=
∑
q1∈Z\{0}:|q1|≤Q1
L(B(0, q1)) +
∑
q0∈Z\{0}:|q0|≤Q0
L(B(q0, 0))
+
∑
q1∈Z\{0}:
|q1|≤Q1
∑
q0∈Z\{0}:
|q0|≤Q0
A0|q0|≤τA1|q1|
L(B(q0, q1))
=
∑
q1∈Z\{0}:
|q1|≤Q1
∑
q0∈Z\{0}:
|q0|≤Q0
A0|q0|≤τA1|q1|
L(B(q0, q1)) (103)
where (103) results from (101) and (102). Note that∣∣{q0 ∈ Z \ {0} : |q0| ≤ Q0, A0|q0| ≤ τA1|q1|}∣∣
≤ 2 min
{
Q0,
τA1|q1|
A0
}
. (104)
With this, we can bound the term in (103) as∑
q1∈Z\{0}:
|q1|≤Q1
∑
q0∈Z\{0}:
|q0|≤Q0
A0|q0|≤τA1|q1|
L(B(q0, q1))
≤ 2Q1 · 2 min
{
Q0,
τA1|q1|
A0
}
· 2(τ − 1)β
A1|q1| (105)
= 8(τ − 1)βmin
{Q1Q0
A1|q1| ,
Q1τ
A0
}
≤ 8(τ − 1)βmin
{Q1Q0
A1
,
Q1τ
A0
}
(106)
where (105) follows from (100) and (104). Therefore, (103) can be further upper bounded by
L(B) ≤ 8(τ − 1)βmin
{Q1Q0
A1
,
Q1τ
A0
}
. (107)
Due to symmetry, by interchanging the roles of A0 and A1, and interchanging the roles of Q0 and Q1,
L(B) can also be upper bounded by
L(B) ≤ 8(τ − 1)βmin
{Q0Q1
A0
,
Q0τ
A1
}
. (108)
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By combining the results in (107) and (108), we finally bound L(B) as
L(B) ≤ 8(τ − 1)βmin
{Q1Q0
A1
,
Q0Q1
A0
,
Q0τ
A1
,
Q1τ
A0
}
. (109)
VII. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
This section provides the proof of Lemma 2. In this proof we will use [31, Lemma 1] described below.
Lemma 6. [31, Lemma 1] Consider the channel model y =
√
Pα1hx+
√
Pα2g + z, where x ∈ Ω(ξ,Q)
is the random variable, z ∼ N (0, σ2), and g ∈ Sg is a discrete random variable such that
|g| ≤ gmax, ∀g ∈ Sg
for a given set Sg ⊂ R. In the above model gmax, σ and h are positive and finite constants independent
of P , and α1 and α2 are two positive parameters such that α1 − α2 > 0. By setting Q and ξ such that
Q =
P
α¯
2 · hγ
2gmax
, ξ = γ · 1
Q
, ∀α¯ ∈ (0, α1 − α2) (110)
where γ > 0 is a finite constant independent of P , then the probability of error for decoding a symbol x
from y is
Pr(e)→ 0 as P →∞.
We will provide the proof of Lemma 2 by focusing on the case with k = 1, as the case with k = 2 can
be proved in a similar way. In this proof, we estimate v1,c, v2,c + u3 and v1,p from y1 expressed in (48)
by using a successive decoding method. At first, v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,c · 1Q , Q = P
2α−1−
2 ) will be estimated
by treating the other signals as noise. Let us rewrite y1 in (48) as
y1 =
√
Ph11h23h12v1,c +
√
Pαg + z1 (111)
where
g,h12h21h13(v2,c + u3) +
√
P 1−2αh11h23h12v1,p +
√
P−αh12h21h13v2,p.
For this case with 1/2 < α ≤ 2/3, it is true that |g| ≤ 4√2 for any realizations of g. At this point, by
using the result of Lemma 6 it implies that the probability of error for estimating v1,c from y1 is
Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0, as P →∞. (112)
The decoded v1,c can be removed from y1, which can allow us to estimate v2,c + u3 from the following
observation
y1 −
√
Ph11h23h12v1,c =
√
Pαh12h21h13(v2,c + u3) +
√
P 1−αg′ + z1 (113)
where g′,h11h23h12v1,p +
√
Pα−1h12h21h13v2,p and v2,c + u3 ∈ 2 · Ω(ξ = γv2,c · 1Q , Q = P
2α−1−
2 ) for
2 ·Ω(ξ,Q),{ξ · a : a ∈ Z ∩ [−2Q, 2Q]}. It is true that |g′| ≤ 2√2 for any realizations of g′. Define sˆvu
as the estimate of svu, v2,c + u3. From the result of Lemma 6, it reveals that
Pr[svu 6= sˆvu|v1,c = vˆ1,c]→ 0, as P →∞. (114)
which, together with (112), gives
Pr[svu 6= sˆvu] ≤ Pr[svu 6= sˆvu|v1,c = vˆ1,c] + Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0 as P →∞. (115)
Similarly, by removing the decoded v2,c + u3 from y1, v1,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,p · 1Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ) can be
estimated with vanishing error probability, i.e.,
Pr[v1,p 6= vˆ1,p]→ 0 as P →∞. (116)
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By combining (112) and (116), it gives that the probability of error for estimating {v1,c, v1,p} from y1
is
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]→ 0 as P →∞
which completes the proof for the case of k = 1. Due to the symmetry, the case of k = 2 can be proved
in a similar way.
VIII. PROOF OF LEMMA 4
The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in this section. In this proof, v1,c, v2,c+u3 and v1,p will be estimated
from y1 (see (48)) by using the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. At first, the following
two symbols
v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,c ·
1
Q
, Q = P
α/2−
2 )
v2,c + u3 ∈ 2 · Ω(ξ = γv2,c ·
1
Q
, Q = P
α/2−
2 )
will be estimated simultaneously from y1 by treating the other signals as noise. Let us rewrite y1 in (48)
as
y1 =
√
Ph11h23h12v1,c +
√
Pαh12h21h13(v2,c + u3) + z˜1
= P
α/2+
2 · 2γ · (
√
P 1−αg0q0 + g1q1) + z˜1 (117)
where z˜1,
√
P 1−αh11h23h12v1,p + h12h21h13v2,p + z1 and
g0,h11h23h12, g1,h12h21h13
q0,
Qmax
2γ
· v1,c, q1, Qmax
2γ
· (v2,c + u3), Qmax,P
α/2−
2
for a given constant γ ∈ (0, 1
8
√
2
]
(see (37)). In this setting, q0, q1 ∈ Z , |q0| ≤ Qmax, |q1| ≤ 2Qmax, and√
P 1−α ∈ Z+, based on our definitions P ,maxk{22mkk} and
√
Pαk` = 2mk` , k, ` = 1, 2.
Let qˆ0 and qˆ1 be the estimates of q0 and q1, respectively, from the observation y1 expressed in (117).
Specifically, we use an estimator that minimizes
|y1 − P
α/2+
2 · 2γ · (
√
P 1−αg0qˆ0 + g1qˆ1)|.
We now consider the minimum distance
dmin(g0, g1), min
q0,q′0∈Z∩[−Qmax,Qmax]
q1,q′1∈Z∩[−2Qmax,2Qmax]
(q0,q1)6=(q′0,q′1)
|
√
P 1−αg0(q0 − q′0) + g1(q1 − q′1)|. (118)
between the signals generated by (q0, q1) and (q′0, q
′
1). Later on, Lemma 7 (see below) shows that the
minimum distance dmin is sufficiently large for almost all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3 when
P is large, with the signal design in (34)-(36) and (75)-(80). Let us now provide Lemma 7, the proof of
which is based on the result of Lemma 1 (see Section IV).
Lemma 7. Consider the signal design in (34)-(36) and (75)-(80) in the case of α ∈ [2/3, 1]. Let δ ∈ (0, 1]
and  > 0. Then the minimum distance dmin defined in (118) is bounded by
dmin ≥ δP−
3α/2−1
2 (119)
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for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3 \ Hout, where Hout ⊆ (1, 2]2×3 is an outage set and the
Lebesgue measure of the outage set, denoted by L(Hout), satisfies
L(Hout) ≤ 1792δ · P− 2 . (120)
Proof. Consider the case of α ∈ [2/3, 1]. Let us set
β, δP−
3α/2−1
2 , A0,
√
P 1−α, A1, 1
Q0, 2Qmax, Q1, 4Qmax, Qmax,P
α/2−
2
for some  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Recall that g0,h11h23h12, g1,h12h21h13. Let τ , 8. Define the event
B(q0, q1),{(g0, g1) ∈ (1, τ ]2 : |A0g0q0 + A1g1q1| < β}
and set
B,
⋃
q0,q1∈Z:
(q0,q1)6=0,
|qk|≤Qk ∀k
B(q0, q1).
We now bound the Lebesgue measure of B by using the result of Lemma 1 (see Section IV), given as
L(B) ≤ 8(τ − 1)βmin{8Q
2
max
1
,
8Q2max√
P 1−α
,
2Qmaxτ
1
,
4Qmaxτ√
P 1−α
}
≤ 8(τ − 1)β ·Qmax ·min{8Qmax, 8Qmax√
P 1−α
, 2τ,
4τ√
P 1−α
}
≤ 8(τ − 1)β ·Qmax · P α−12 ·min{8Qmax, 4τ}
≤ 8(τ − 1)β ·Qmax · P α−12 · 4τ
= 32τ(τ − 1)β · P 3α/2−1−2
= 32τ(τ − 1)δ · P− 2
= 1792δ · P− 2 . (121)
From our definition, the set B is the collection of (g0, g1), where (g0, g1) ∈ (1, τ ]2. For any (g0, g1) ∈ B,
there exists at least one pair (q0, q1) ∈ {q0, q1 : q0, q1 ∈ Z, (q0, q1) 6= 0, |q0| ≤ Q0, |q1| ≤ Q1} such that
|A0g0q0 + A1g1q1| < δP− 3α/2−12 . Thus, we can consider the set B as an outage set. For any pair (g0, g1)
that is outside the outage set B, we have the following conclusion:
dmin(g0, g1) ≥ δP−
3α/2−1
2 , for (g0, g1) /∈ B.
Let us now define Hout as a set of the (h11, h21, h12, h22, h13, h23) ∈ (1, 2]2×3 such that the corresponding
pairs (g0, g1) are in the outage set B, i.e.,
Hout,{(h11, h21, h12, h22, h13, h23) ∈ (1, 2]2×3 : (g0, g1) ∈ B}.
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At this point, with the connection between Hout and B, we can bound the Lebesgue measure of Hout as
L(Hout)=
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h22=1
∫ 2
h13=1
∫ 2
h23=1
1Hout(h11,h21,h12,h22,h13,h23)dh23dh13dh22dh12dh21dh11
(122)
=
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h22=1
∫ 2
h13=1
∫ 2
h23=1
1B(h11h23h12, h12h21h13)dh23dh13dh22dh12dh21dh11
≤
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h22=1
∫ τ
g1=1
∫ τ
g0=1
1B(g0, g1) · 1
h11h212h21
dg0dg1dh22dh12dh21dh11
≤
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h22=1
∫ τ
g1=1
∫ τ
g0=1
1B(g0, g1)dg0dg1dh22dh12dh21dh11
=
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h22=1
L(B)dh22dh12dh21dh11
≤
∫ 2
h11=1
∫ 2
h21=1
∫ 2
h12=1
∫ 2
h22=1
1792δ · P− 2dh22dh12dh21dh11 (123)
= 1792δ · P− 2 (124)
where (123) follows from the result in (121); in the above derivations we use the following definitions
1Hout(h11, h21, h12, h22, h13, h23) =
{
1 if (h11, h21, h12, h22, h13, h23) ∈ Hout
0 if (h11, h21, h12, h22, h13, h23) /∈ Hout
and
1B(g0, g1) =
{
1 if (g0, g1) ∈ B
0 if (g0, g1) /∈ B .
Then, we complete the proof of Lemma 7.
The result of Lemma 7 reveals that, the minimum distance dmin is sufficiently large for all the channel
coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3 except for a bounded set Hout ⊆ (1, 2]2×3 whose Lebesgue measure satisfies
L(Hout)→ 0, as P →∞.
In the following, we will consider the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3 that are not in the outage set
Hout. With this channel condition, the minimum distance dmin is bounded by
dmin ≥ δP−
3α/2−1
2 .
Let us now go back to the expression of y1 in (117), which can also be described as
y1 =P
α/2+
2 · 2γ (
√
P 1−αg0q0 + g1q1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,xs
+
√
P 1−α
(
h11h23h12v1,p +
1√
P 1−α
h12h21h13v2,p
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
, g˜
+z1
=P
α/2+
2 · 2γ · xs +
√
P 1−αg˜ + z1 (127)
where
xs,
√
P 1−αg0q0 + g1q1
21
and g˜,h11h23h12v1,p + 1√P 1−αh12h21h13v2,p, with
|g˜| ≤ g˜max,
√
2 ∀g˜
In the first step we will decode the sum xs =
√
P 1−αg0q0 + g1q1 from y1 by treating other signals as
noise. This step is called as noise removal. After correctly decoding xs, we can recover q0 and q1 from
xs because g0 and g1 are rationally independent. This step is called as signal separation (cf. [34]). Given
that the minimum distance for xs is dmin defined in (118), Lemma 7 reveals that this minimum distance
is bounded by dmin ≥ δP− 3α/2−12 when the channels are not in the outage set, that is, {hk`} /∈ Hout.
Define xˆs as the estimate for xs from y1 by choosing the point close to xs. Then, the error probability
for decoding xs from y1 in (127) is
Pr[xs 6= xˆs] ≤Pr
[
|z1 + P 1−α2 g˜| > P
α/2+
2 · 2γ · dmin
2
]
≤Pr[z1 > P
α/2+
2 · 2γ · dmin
2
− P 1−α2 g˜max]
+ Pr[z1 > P
α/2+
2 · 2γ · dmin
2
− P 1−α2 g˜max] (128)
=2 ·Q(P α/2+2 · 2γ · dmin
2
− P 1−α2 g˜max
)
≤2 ·Q(P 1−α2 (γδP 2 −√2)) (129)
where the Q-function is defined as Q(a), 1√
2pi
∫∞
a
exp(− s2
2
)ds; (128) follows from that |g˜| ≤
g˜max,
√
2,∀g˜; (129) is from that dmin ≥ δP− 3α/2−12 . By using the identity that Q(a) ≤
1
2
exp(−a2/2), ∀a ≥ 0, and together with (129), we can have the following bound
Pr[xs 6= xˆs] ≤ exp
(
−P
1−α(γδP 2 −√2)2
2
)
when γδP

2 −√2 ≥ 0. Therefore, when P →∞, it implies that γδP 2 −√2 ≥ 0, which then gives the
following conclusion on the error probability for decoding xs from y1
Pr[xs 6= xˆs]→ 0 as P →∞. (130)
After decoding xs =
√
P 1−αg0q0 + g1q1 correctly from y1, we can recover the symbols q0 and q1 because
g0 and g1 are rationally independent.
In the second step, the decoded xs can be removed from y1 and then v1,p can be decoded from
y1 − P
α/2+
2 · 2γ · xs =
√
P 1−αh11h23h12v1,p + h12h21h13v2,p + z1.
Given that v1,p, v2,p ∈ Ω(ξ = γ · 1Q , Q = P
1−α−
2 ) and h12h21h13v2,p ≤ 1√2 , the result of Lemma 6 reveals
that the error probability for decoding v1,p is
Pr[v1,p 6= vˆ1,p]→ 0 as P →∞. (131)
At this point, it holds true that the error probability of estimating {v1,c, v1,p} from y1 is
Pr[{v1,c 6= vˆ1,c} ∪ {v1,p 6= vˆ1,p}]→ 0 as P →∞ (132)
for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3 \ Hout, with Lebesgue measure L(Hout) satisfying
L(Hout)→ 0, as P →∞.
Due to the symmetry, the case of k = 2 can be proved in a similar way.
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IX. CONVERSE
In this section, we provide the converse proof of the secure sum GDoF in Theorem 1, focusing on the
two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with a helper defined in Section II. The converse proof
is based on the following two steps:
1) The secure capacity region of the interference channel with a helper and with secrecy constraints,
denoted by C, is outer bounded by the capacity region of the interference channel with a helper but
without secrecy constraints (denoted by Ch,ns), i.e.,
C ⊆ Ch,ns
due to the fact that secrecy constraints will not enlarge the capacity region.
2) The capacity region of the interference channel with a helper is outer bounded by the capacity region
of the interference channel without a helper (denoted by Cnh,ns), i.e.,
Ch,ns ⊆ Cnh,ns
because the helper’s signal that is independent of the other transmitters’ signals, will not enlarge the
capacity region for this setting without secrecy constraints.
Therefore, it implies that
C ⊆ Cnh,ns.
In other words, the capacity region Cnh,ns (and the GDoF region respectively) of the interference channel
without a helper and without secrecy constraints (see [32]), will sever as the outer bound of the secure
capacity region C (and the secure GDoF region respectively) of the interference channel with a helper
and with secrecy constraints.
X. CONCLUSION
For the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel, this work revealed an interesting observation
that adding a helper can totally remove the secrecy constraints, in terms of GDoF performance. In the
proposed scheme, the cooperative jamming and a careful signal design are used such that the jamming
signal of the helper is aligned at a specific direction and power level with the information signals of the
transmitters. It turns out that, the penalty in GDoF due to the secrecy constraints can be totally removed.
In the rate analysis, the estimation approaches of noise removal and signal separation due to the rational
independence are used. In the future work, we will extend the result to the other communication channels
with a helper.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
In this section we will provide the proof of Lemma 3. We first focus on the proof for the first user
(k = 1). In the following, v2,c + u3 and v1,c can be estimated from y1 by using a successive decoding
method with vanishing error probability, where y1 is expressed in (68). At first, v2,c + u3 ∈ 2 · Ω(ξ =
γv2,c · 1Q , Q = P
1−
2 ) can be estimated from y1 by treating the other signals as noise, where y1 in (68)
can be described as
y1 =
√
Pαh12h21h13(v2,c + u3) +
√
Ph11h23h12v1,c + z1. (133)
In this case with α ≥ 2, we have |h11h23h12v1,c| ≤
√
2 for any realizations of v1,c. Let sˆvu be the estimate
of svu, v2,c + u3. From Lemma 6 it is true that
Pr[svu 6= sˆvu]→ 0, as P →∞.
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Once v2,c + u3 is decoded, it can be removed from y1. After that, v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = γv1,c · 1Q , Q = P
1−
2 )
can be estimated from the following observation
y1 −
√
Pαh12h21h13(v2,c + u3) =
√
Ph11h23h12v1,c + z1
with vanishing error probability, i.e.,
Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0 as P →∞ (134)
which completes the proof for the case of k = 1. Similarly, the case of k = 2 can be proved due to the
symmetry.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
In this section we will provide the proof of Lemma 5, which is similar to that of Lemma 4. In this
case with α ∈ [1, 2], the two symbols
v1,c ∈ Ω(ξ = 2γ · 1
Q
,Q = P
α/2−
2 )
v2,c + u3 ∈ 2 · Ω(ξ = 2γ · 1
Q
, Q = P
α/2−
2 )
will be estimated from y1 by using the approaches of noise removal and signal separation. The expression
of y1 is given in (68), which can be rewritten as
y1 =
√
Ph11h23h12v1,c +
√
Pαh12h21h13(v2,c + u3) + z1
=
√
P 1−α/2+ · 2γ · (g¯0q¯0 +
√
Pα−1g¯1q¯1) + z1
=
√
P 1−α/2+ · 2γ · x¯s + z1 (135)
where γ ∈ (0, 1
8
√
2
]
, x¯s,(g¯0q¯0 +
√
Pα−1g¯1q¯1), g¯0,h11h23h12, g¯1,h12h21h13 and
q¯0,
Qmax
2γ
· v1,c, q¯1, Qmax
2γ
· (v2,c + u3), Qmax,P
α/2−
2 .
In this setting, q¯0, q¯1 ∈ Z , |q¯0| ≤ Qmax, |q¯1| ≤ 2Qmax,
√
Pα−1 ∈ Z+ based on our definitions. Let us
define the minimum distance for x¯s as
d¯min(g¯0, g¯1), min
q¯0,q¯′0,∈Z∩[−Qmax,Qmax]
q¯1,q¯′1∈Z∩[−2Qmax,2Qmax]
(q¯0,q¯1)6=(q¯′0,q¯′1)
|g¯0(q¯0 − q¯′0) +
√
Pα−1g¯1(q¯1 − q¯′1)|. (136)
A lower bound on the minimum distance d¯min is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Consider the signal design in (34)-(36) and (88)-(91) for the case with α ∈ [1, 2]. Let δ ∈ (0, 1]
and  > 0. The minimum distance d¯min defined in (136) is bounded by
dmin ≥ δP−
1−α/2
2 (137)
for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3 \ H¯out, where H¯out ⊆ (1, 2]2×3 is an outage set and the
the Lebesgue measure of the this outage set, denoted by L(H¯out), satisfies
L(H¯out) ≤ 1792δ · P− 2 . (138)
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to that of the Lemma 7. Considering the case of α ∈ [1, 2], let
us set
β¯, δP−
1−α/2
2 , A¯0, 1, A¯1,
√
Pα−1
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Q0, 2Qmax, Q1, 4Qmax, Qmax,P
α/2−
2
for some  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Recall that g¯0,h11h23h12 and g¯1,h12h21h13. Let τ , 8. We define the
event
B¯(q¯0, q¯1),{(g¯0, g¯1) ∈ (1, τ ]2 : |A¯0g¯0q¯0 + A¯1g¯1q¯1| < β¯} (139)
and set
B¯,
⋃
q¯0,q¯1∈Z:
(q¯0,q¯1)6=0,
|q¯k|≤Qk ∀k
B(q¯0, q¯1). (140)
By using Lemma 1, we bound the Lebesgue measure of B¯ as
L(B¯) ≤ 8(τ − 1)βmin{8Q
2
max√
Pα−1
,
8Q2max
1
,
2Qmaxτ√
Pα−1
,
4Qmaxτ
1
}
≤ 8(τ − 1)β ·Qmax ·min{ 8Qmax√
Pα−1
, 8Qmax,
2τ√
Pα−1
, 4τ}
≤ 8(τ − 1)β ·Qmax · P 1−α2 ·min{8Qmax, 4τ}
≤ 8(τ − 1)β ·Qmax · P 1−α2 · 4τ
= 32τ(τ − 1)β · P 1−α/2−2
= 32τ(τ − 1)δ · P− 2
= 1792δ · P− 2 . (141)
We can consider set B¯ as an outage set. For any pair (g¯0, g¯1) that is outside the outage set B¯, we can
conclude that d¯min(g¯0, g¯1) ≥ δP− 1−α/22 . Let us now define H¯out as a set of the (h11, h21, h12, h22, h13, h23) ∈
(1, 2]2×3 such that the corresponding pairs (g¯0, g¯1) are in the outage set B, that is,
H¯out,{(h11, h21, h12, h22, h13, h23) ∈ (1, 2]2×3 : (g¯0, g¯1) ∈ B¯}.
With the connection between H¯out and B¯, one can follow the steps in (122)-(124) to bound the Lebesgue
measure of H¯out as:
L(H¯out) ≤ 1792δ · P− 2 . (142)
Let us now go back to the expression of y1 in (135), i.e.,
y1 =
√
P 1−α/2+ · 2γ · x¯s + z1.
Note that the minimum distance for x¯s is d¯min defined in (136). Lemma 8 shows that this minimum distance
for x¯s is bounded by d¯min ≥ δP− 1−α/22 when the channels are not in the outage set, i.e., {hk`} /∈ H¯out.
This implies that we can estimate x¯s from y1 with vanishing error probability as P → ∞. Since g¯0 and
g¯1 are rationally independent, we can recover the symbols q¯0 and q¯1 from x¯s = (g¯0q¯0 +
√
Pα−1g¯1q¯1) after
decoding x¯s. Then, the error probability for decoding v1,c can be concluded as
Pr[v1,c 6= vˆ1,c]→ 0 as P →∞ (143)
which is true for all the channel coefficients {hk`} ∈ (1, 2]2×3 \ Hout, with Lebesgue measure L(H¯out)
satisfying
L(H¯out)→ 0, as P →∞.
Similarly, the result in (143) can also be extended to the case of k = 2 due to the symmetry.
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